THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN PRIVATE PARTY
IMMUNITY: EXTENDING QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY FROM 42 U.S.C. § 1983
TO PRIVATE PRISONS
ROBERT G. SCHAFFER
INTRODUCrION

A decade ago, proponents of privatizing governmental services
hailed the private operation of correctional facilities as a way to

improve prison conditions and reduce costs.' Skeptics doubted
these claims and warned of the danger in delegating the care of

inmates to corporations "more interested in doing well than in
doing good."2 Although the problems of prison overcrowding and

escalating costs still frustrate state policy makers, contracting with
private parties for the operation of prisons and jails remains a
serious alternative for legislatures unwilling to spend state funds

on additional public facilities. Roughly one-third of the states have
passed legislation enabling state and local agencies to contract with

private firms for full-scale correctional services,4 and several oth-

1. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD
MORE EFFECrIVE GOVERNMENT 146-59 (1988); Harry Bacas, When Prisons and Profits
Go Together, NATION'S Bus., Oct. 1984, at 62.

2.

Ira P. Robbins, The Legal Dimensions of Private Incarceration, 38 AM. U. L.

REV. 531, 542 (1989).

3. See Dana C. Joel, The Privatization of Secure Adult Prisons: Issues and Evidence,
in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 51, 51-52 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds.
1993).
4. ALASKA STAT. § 33.30.031(a) (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-106 (Michie
1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-27-104 (1986 & Supp. 1995): FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 957.01-.14 (West Supp. 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.505(1) (Baldwin 1991); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 1800.4(A) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann.
§ 53-30-106(3) (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-17 (Michie 1990); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
57, § 504(7) (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 24-11-39 (1995);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-103 (1990 & Supp. 1995); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 494.001(a) (West 1990); UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-13-26 (1993); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 53.1-262 (Michie Supp. 1995); W. VA. CODE §§ 25-5-1 to -20 (1992 & Supp. 1995);
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 301.08(1)(b) (West 1991); WYO. STAT. § 7-18-104 (1995).
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Despite this increase, opponents of private incarceration argue
that the introduction of the profit motive will lead private prison
officials to reduce the level of care afforded to inmates and cut
comers with respect to the protection of inmates' constitutional
rights.7 To counteract this financial disincentive, opponents argue
that private prisons should not be given the same qualified immunity from section 1983 suits enjoyed by officials of public prisons.8
Civil rights damage suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' are the most
common avenue of redress available to an inmate who claims a
government official" has violated a right guaranteed by the Con-

5. Enabling legislation has been introduced in Arizona, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina. Joel, supra note 3, at 60. Nebraska and North Carolina have also considered enabling legislation. Charles W. Thomas & Charles H. Logan, The Development,
Present Status, and Future Potential of Correctional Privatization in America, in PRIVATIZING CORRECTIONAL INSTrUTIONS 213, 221 (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1993).
6. In 1984, Corrections Corporation of America opened the first privately operated
adult jail in Hamilton County, Tennessee. See CHARLES H. LOGAN, PRIVATE PRISONS:
CONS AND PROS 31 (1990). In 1990, about a dozen states contracted out the operations
of prisons to the private sector. Id. at 20. A 1992 survey revealed that at least 18 private
firms were operating over 50 facilities, and that an additional 8 facilities were to be
opened in 1993. Charles W. Thomas, Growth in Corrections Accelerates, PUBLIC WORKS
FINANCING, July/Aug. 1992, at 11, 13. The confluence of factors providing the impetus
for the private prison industry is described in Thomas & Logan, supra note 5, at
217-221.
7. See, e.g., Susan L. Kay, The Implications of Prison Privatization on the Conduct
of Prisoner Litigation Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REV. 867, 887 (1987).
8. See id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every Person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). A plaintiff also may bring a civil damage suit against federal
officials directly under the Constitution. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The analysis is the same whether a suit proceeds under § 1983 or under Bivens. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)
("[W]e deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between
suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the
Constitution against federal officials.").
10. A § 1983 suit may proceed only where the defendant acted "under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.
... 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The standard for determining whether an individual acted "under color of state law" for
§ 1983 purposes is the same as the constitutional standard for determining "state action."
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 928-29 (1982) (citations omitted).
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stitution or the laws of the United States. Qualified immunity,
however, bars section 1983 suits against certain local, state, and
federal officials when their conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known."11 Those opposed to extending qualified immunity to private prison officials argue that such immunity,

when combined with the financial self-interest of private prisons,
will water down section 1983's important protections and allow
private prisons to maximize profits by violating the rights of inmates. 2 Denying qualified immunity, even when a prison official
could not reasonably have known that his conduct was unconstitu-

tional, will force private prison officials to think carefully before
taking action that may result in a constitutional violation. 3
Proponents of privatization respond by arguing that private
entities under contract to operate correctional facilities should be
afforded the same qualified immunity as their public sector counterparts. Because private prisons serve the same function as public
prisons, they qualify as "state actors" and thus are subject to the
same panoply of constitutional restrictions.'4 Fairness suggests

11. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A varying degree of immunity--either absolute or qualified-is available to most public officials engaged in functions
requiring the exercise of discretion. For example, executive and administrative officials
performing important discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity bars liability unless an official reasonably should have known that his conduct
would violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right. Harlow, 457 U.S. at
818-19. A right is "clearly established" if "[tihe contours of the right [are] sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Absolute immunity provides a
complete bar to liability without regard to the clarity of the right violated or the unreasonableness of the official's conduct. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976). Judges, prosecutors, and legislators are afforded absolute immunity for actions taken in the
performance of their judicial, prosecutorial, and legislative duties, respectively. See Stump
v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 (1978) (judges); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,
420-29 (1976) (prosecutors); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372-75 (1951) (legislators).
12. See Kay, supra note 7, at 887-88.
13. Id.
14. Although no court has determined whether a private prison is a state actor subject to suit under § 1983, no private prison has challenged its status as a state actor. In
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982), the Supreme Court made it much
easier for plaintiffs to bring suit against private parties under the "joint participation"
rationale of state action. A private defendant is a state actor when the party "acted
together with or . . . obtained significant aid from state officials." Id. at 937. The Court
applied the "joint participation" rationale in West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), and
concluded that a physician under contract with the state to provide medical services to
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that private prison officials should be able to assert the same
qualified immunity from section 1983 suits as public prison officials.' 5 Section 1983 suits by prisoners are common and are costly
to litigate, even though they are seldom successful. 6 Proponents
assert that extending qualified immunity to private prisons will
create a "flat playing field" upon which public and private entities
could fairly compete.'7
Until recently, the Supreme Court had not decided whether
considerations of fairness would justify extending qualified immunity to private as well as public defendants." But in the case of
Wyatt v. Cole, 9 the Supreme Court resolved the issue when it
stated that "principles of equality and fairness" alone do not justify extending qualified immunity to private defendants." In Wyatt,
the Court rejected qualified immunity for private defendants who
are sued under section 1983 for invoking an unconstitutional state
replevin, garnishment or attachment statute. 2' The Court reasoned that although "equality and fairness" may suggest treating
public and private defendants similarly, these interests are "not
sufficiently similar to the traditional purposes of qualified immunity to justify such an expansion."' Rather, the role of qualified
immunity exclusively involves "protecting government's ability to
inmates at a state prison hospital acts "under color of state law" within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 when he treats an inmate. lId at 57. Furthermore, a private individual
may act "under color of state law" if he exercises those powers "traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State." Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
Under the reasoning of these cases, there appears to be little doubt that private prison
officials meet the requirement for state action. Commentators who have addressed the

issue agree. See, e.g., Robbins, supra note 2, at 602.
15. In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), the Court extended qualified
immunity from § 1983 suits to state prison officials.
16. Charles W. Thomas, Resolving the Problem of Qualified Immunity for Private
Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage Suits, 53 LA. L. REV. 449, 454 (1992).

17. See, eg., id.
18. This lick of direction has led to conflict among the circuits over whether private
defendants may assert a qualified immunity defense. See infra text accompanying notes
97-139.
19. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
20. Id. at 168.
21. Id. at 168-69. The replevin statute at issue in Wyatt was held unconstitutional

because it violated due process by failing to afford judges discretion to deny writs of replevin. Id. The Court assumed, without deciding, that the private defendant in Wyatt

qualified as a state actor. Id. at 160; cf. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941
(1982) (holding that the private use of a state attachment statute constitutes "state action").
22. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168.
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perform its traditional functions... [and] preserv[ing officials']
ability to serve the public good .... ."' Notwithstanding the unfairness of denying qualified immunity to a private party who
qualifies as a state actor, extending qualified immunity in this
situation would serve only the private financial interests of the
defendant and would not operate "to safeguard government, and
thereby ... protect the public at large."24 After Wyatt, any extension of qualified immunity to private parties depends on whether the extension benefits the public interest.'
Although Wyatt resolves the immunity issue for private defendants who claim qualified immunity in pursuit of their private
commercial interests, courts will confront a very different set of
facts when a private prison asserts a qualified immunity defense.O
Unlike the private party in Wyatt, a private prison performs an
important public function and serves important public interestsY
The contractual relationship between the private prison and the
state often is based on a legislative conclusion that the private
entity can best meet public needs.O Perhaps more importantly,
extending qualified immunity to private prisons may serve the
same "traditional purposes of qualified immunity" that are served
by affording qualified immunity to state prison officials. 29 Whether these distinctions are sufficient to justify the extension of qualified immunity to private prisons is the principal concern of this
Note.
The novelty of the legal issue and consequent lack of cases
addressing claims of qualified immunity by private prisons have
made it difficult to assess how courts will treat the argument that

23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.at 167.
Id at 168.
See infra text accompanying notes 69-71.
See Thomas, supra note 16, at 453 (concluding that the circumstances surrounding

a private prison official's claim of qualified immunity "are easily distinguished from the
facts presented by Wyatt").

27. See infra text accompanying notes 163-65.
28. For example, Tennessee law states that a prison contractor must offer "substantial cost savings to the state" at a "level and quality of services which are at least equal
to those which would be provided by the state." TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(c)(1),
(2) (1990). Florida law requires a private contractor to provide cost savings to the state

of at least 7% over the public sector costs for a similar facility. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 957.07 (West Supp. 1995). Texas law requires cost savings to the state of at least 10%.
See TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 494.003(c)(4) (West 1990).
29. See infra text accompanying notes 174-75.

1054

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1049

qualified immunity should be extended to private prisons." This
Note seeks to remove some of that uncertainty by examining four
recent federal district court decisions that have decided claims of
qualified immunity by private prisons: Tinnen v. Corrections Corp.
of America,31 Smith v. United States,32 Manis v. Corrections
Corp. of America,33 and Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center.'
Although three district courts have extended qualified immunity to
private prisons, one court has denied qualified immunity.35 This
Note addresses the objections of the dissenting court and argues
that despite the objections, qualified immunity should be extended
to private prisons.
Part I sets forth the rationale behind the judicial recognition
of qualified immunity from liability under section 1983 and discusses the approach taken by the Supreme Court in determining
whether to extend qualified immunity to new classes of defendants. Part II identifies the conflict among the circuits over whether qualified immunity should be extended to private parties and
examines the recent holding in Wyatt v. Cole, which addressed the
split in the circuits. Part III argues that Wyatt does not preclude
granting private prisons the same qualified immunity as their public counterparts because distinctions exist between the private
defendant in Wyatt and private prisons. Part III then discusses the
four federal district court decisions that have decided claims of
qualified immunity by private prisons and addresses objections to
the expansion of qualified immunity. The Note concludes that
private prison officials, like their public counterparts, should be
immune from liability under section 1983 unless prison officials
should have known that their conduct would violate the clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of an inmate.

30. See Thomas, supra note 16, at 471 (noting "limited Supreme Court guidance"
regarding the issue and "few reported cases . . . factually based on this type of rela-

tionship
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

between the public and private sectors").
No. 91-2188-TUA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20309 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1993).
850 F. Supp. 984 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
859 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
891 F. Supp 312 (W.D. La. 1995).
See infra text accompanying notes 178-227.
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF QUALIFED IMMUNrrY DOcrRINE
A.

The Rationale for Immunity from Section 1983

In Tenney v. Brandhove, 6 the Supreme Court first considered whether a defendant could assert immunity from suits
brought under section 1983. Tenney involved a civil rights damage
suit against several members of the California legislature.3 7 Although section 1983 on its face makes liable "[e]very person who,
under color of any statute, 38 deprives another of his civil rights,
the Court concluded that Congress, by its general language, did
not intend to abolish all common law immunities. 39 Based on this
statutory construction, the Court interpreted section 1983 to incorporate all immunities existing when Congress enacted section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1871.' In later cases, the Court made
clear that its interpretation also prohibits any extension of immunities beyond those recognized at common law.4 In Tenney, the
Court held that legislators are entitled to assert absolute immunity
from civil damage suits because the common law clearly recognized the privilege of legislators to be free from liability when
acting "in the sphere of legitimate legislative activity."'4 2 After
Tenney, a defendant may assert a claim of immunity from section
1983 only if a similarly situated defendant would have enjoyed the
same immunity from tort liability at common law.
The Supreme Court also recognized the possibility that the
important purposes of section 19834' might be frustrated if officials clothed with the authority of the state are afforded immunity
for every alleged constitutional deprivation.' Because of this

36. 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
37. Id. at 369.
38. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 43 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988))).
39. Id. at 376.
40. Ch.22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)).
41. See, e.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980) (stating that §
1983 incorporates an immunity only if that immunity "was well established at common
law at the time § 1983 was enacted").
42. Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
43. The important purposes of § 1983 are to deter officials from using their positions
to deprive individuals of their civil rights, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974),
and to compensate victims if such deterrence fails, Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-57

(1978).
44. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981) (observing
that "because the 1871 Act was designed to expose state and local officials to a new
form of liability, it would defeat the promise of the statute to recognize any pre-existing

1056

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1049

threat, the Court added to its historical analysis an inquiry into
whether the public policy considerations that support a particular
government official's claim of immunity from section 1983 are
sufficiently similar to the traditional purposes that underlie the
common law immunity.' By recognizing only those claims of immunity from section 1983 that are justified by the same policy
considerations relied upon at common law, this inquiry serves to
strike a balance between the government's interest in effectively
performing its traditional functions and the individual plaintiff's
right to receive compensation when injured by official misconduct.' These two inquiries form the test used by courts to determine whether to recognize a particular defendant's claim of
immunity. The defendant in a section 1983 suit is entitled to immunity if the defendant's conduct would have been shielded from
tort liability at common law in 1871 and if the same strong public
policy reasons underlying the common law immunity support an
identical immunity from section 1983 today.
B. The Court's "FunctionalApproach to Immunity Questions"
In determining under the first prong of the test for immunity
whether a particular governinental official would have been immune from liability at common law, the Court looks to the function that the official is required to perform.47 If an official sued
under section 1983 acts pursuant to a function protected by immunity at common law, the official satisfies the first prong of the test
for immunity. ' The Court has been insistent on noting, as was
the common law tradition, that immunity is not a reward for holdimmunity without determining both the policies that it serves and its compatibility with
the purposes of § 1983").
45. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421 (1976) (noting that "decisions on
§ 1983 immunities . . . [are] predicated upon a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind it"); see
also City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 258-59 (stating that only after consideration "of both
history and policy has the Court construed § 1983" to incorporate a particular immunity).
46. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992).
47. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (focusing on the officer's
duties rather than his title); Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430 (focusing on "the functional nature
of the activities" performed by prosecutors).
48. If the function that the official performs was accorded absolute immunity at
common law, the official will be accorded absolute immunity from liability under § 1983.
See infra text accompanying notes 58-60. If the function was accorded only good faith
immunity at common law, the official will enjoy only qualified immunity from liability
under § 1983. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
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ing public office, but rather derives from the performance of an
important government "function."4 9 To claim an immunity from
section 1983 liability, a defendant must show that "the responsibilities of his office embraced a function" so important as to merit
immunity at common law and that "he was discharging the protected function when performing the act for which liability is asserted."5
For example, in Pierson v. Ray,"l several police officers were
sued under section 1983 for violating the civil rights of several
black clergymen who had entered the segregated area of a bus
terminal and were arrested.52 The Mississippi breach of peace
statute, under which the plaintiffs were arrested, was later found
unconstitutional in a separate case. The Supreme Court stated
that, at common law, police officers were not liable for false arrest
or imprisonment if they acted in good faith and with probable
cause in making an arrest.

3

Placing considerable emphasis on an

officer's function or "duty" to make arrests when probable cause
exists.' the Court afforded the officers qualified immunity from
section 1983 suits arising out of the performance of their law
enforcement function. 55
56
The Court's "functional approach to immunity questions,
explicitly recognizes that for certain special functions, it is "better
to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to
subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of re-

49. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812-13 (1982).
50. Id. The Supreme Court has stated that it looks to the common law when assessing a particular official's claim of immunity because its "role is 'not to make a freewheel-

ing policy choice,' but rather to discern Congress' likely intent in enacting § 1983." Burns
v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)).
The Court also stated that it does not "have a license to establish immunities from

§ 1983 actions in the interests of what we judge to be sound public policy." Id. (quoting
Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 922-23 (1984)).
51. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 556-57.
54. Id. at 555.
55. Id. at 557. The immunity was qualified by requiring the officers to show that
they reasonably believed in good faith that the arrest was constitutional, even though the
arrest later was held to be unconstitutional. Id.
56. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988).
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taliation." s For example, officials exercising legislative,58 judicial59 and prosecutorial' functions are accorded absolute immunity for acts performed in furtherance of their respective "core"
functions.6 ' Other officials exercising significant discretion in the
performance of important executive and administrative functions
are accorded qualified immunity. These officials include police offi6
school board members,6 state
cers, 62 state prison officials,63
hospital administrators, 5 federal cabinet members' and FBI
agents.67 In each of these instances, immunity from section 1983
derives from the important governmental function that the official
is required to perform, and not from any reward for holding public office or any sympathy that the courts have for governmental
officials.6
C. The Traditional Purposes of Qualified Immunity
Since the initial recognition in Tenney v. Brandhove that a
government official may assert immunity from liability under section 1983, the Court's ensuing line of cases largely has pushed the
historical part of its two-part test into the background and has
brought into sharp relief the important considerations of public
policy that were crucial in justifying the recognition of immunities
at common law.69 Several key policy considerations underlie the

57. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 428 (1976) (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177

F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950)).
58. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).

59. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
60. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409.

61. For example, absolute immunity for judges is limited to "judicial acts." Forrester
v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227 (1988) (holding that nonjudicial, administrative acts by judges
are to be accorded only qualified immunity). Absolute immunity for prosecutors is like-

wise limited to acts "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 493 (1991) (citation omitted) (holding that acts taken
pursuant to the prosecutorial function of giving legal advice to police are to be accorded

only qualified immunity).
62. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967)
63. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
64. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1974).

65. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
66. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
67. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 644-46 (1987).
68. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (stating that "it [is] the nature
of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that inform[s]
our immunity analysis").
69. See Procunier v. Naverarette, 434 U.S. 555, 568 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
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recognition of immunity from liability under section 1983 and
comprise what the Supreme Court today calls "the traditional
purposes of qualified immunity."70 An examination of the Court's
immunity decisions demonstrates that if a new class of defendants
is to successfully claim immunity from section 1983, the extension
of immunity must: (1) ensure that governmental officials are not
deterred from exercising the important functions of their office;
(2) ensure that able citizens are not deterred from accepting public office; and (3) protect the public from the substantial costs
associated with the litigation of repeated section 1983 suits.71
In the Supreme Court's first immunity decision, Tenney v.
Brandhove,2 the Court did not discuss extensively the interests
that underlie the recognition of absolute immunity for legislators,
but it did note that such immunity was justified by the public
interest. 3 The Court stated that "[1]egislators are immune from
deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their legislative duty, not
for their private indulgence but for the public good."'7 4 The Court
emphasized the importance of ensuring that legislators are not
deterred from performing their legislative duties, including the
duty of investigation.75 By recognizing that absolute legislative
immunity was necessary to further these important public interests,
the Court established a precedent of conditioning immunity on a
showing that the immunity is required to serve the public interest.
This precedent has been followed in nearly every case since
Tenney.
In Pierson v. Ray,76 the Court's second immunity decision,
the Court briefly and perhaps unwittingly wandered from its earli(noting that the Court's initial "inquiry into the common law ... [has] been abandoned"). Several commentators argue that the Court has eschewed its historical analysis
by extending immunity to new classes of defendants largely upon "free-wheeling policy
choice[s]." Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)). See, e.g., David Rudovsky, The Qualified
Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 23, 36 ("Today, [qualified immunity] stands as a legal
principle defined primarily by the Court's own policy judgment that an individual's right
to compensation .

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

..

should be subordinated to the governmental interest ...

Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168 (1992).
See infra text accompanying notes 74-96.
341 U.S. 367 (1951).
Id. at 377.
Id.
Id. at 377-78.
386 U.S. 547 (1967).

.
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er position in Tenney that the expansion of immunity must be
necessary to serve the public interest. In Pierson, the Court held
that the interest of fairness required recognizing qualified immunity for police officers who are sued under section 1983 for making
an arrest pursuant to an unconstitutional statute.' The Court
stated that "[a] policeman's lot is not so unhappy that he must
choose between being charged with dereliction of duty if he does
not arrest when he has probable cause, and being mulcted in
damages if he does.""8 The Court reasoned that "the same consideration" required recognizing qualified immunity from section
1983 when an officer acts under a law subsequently held to be
unconstitutional. 9 Although qualified immunity for police officers
also may serve the public interest of ensuring that officers are not
deterred from exercising their important duties, the Court failed to
identify this rationale and relied solely on the injustice of denying
qualified immunity to law enforcement officials.'
In later cases, the Court moved away from the unfairness or
injustice rationale and toward the notion that immunity is required
for the public good. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,.' a case extending
qualified immunity to a governor and other state officials, the
Court set forth "two mutually dependent rationales"' for the
common law immunity doctrine:
(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obliga-

tions of his position, to exercise discretion; [and] (2) the danger
that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to
execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment re-

quired by the public good.'
The Court stated that in determining whether to recognize immu-

nity from liability, "one policy consideration seems to pervade the
analysis: the public interest requires decisions and action to enforce laws for the protection of the public."'

77.
78.
79.
80.

Id at 555.
Id
I,
See id at 554-57.

81.

416 U.S. 232 (1974).

82. Id at 240.
83.

Id

84. Id at 241.
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Beginning with Scheuer, all of the Court's subsequent section
1983 immunity decisions have relied heavily on the argument that
the public will be harmed if officials are deterred from effectively
performing vital public functions due to the threat of liability
under section 1983. The officials with which the Court is most
concerned are those required to exercise a significant degree of
discretion in safeguarding the public. For example, in Scheuer, the
Court extended qualified immunity to the governor of Ohio and
several officers of the Ohio National Guard for their conduct in
connection with the student killings at Kent State University in
1971.' The Court emphasized that qualified immunity served the
purpose of ensuring that officials are undeterred in the execution
of important discretionary functions:
In common with police officers.... officials with a broad range
of duties and authority must often act swiftly and firmly at the
risk that action deferred will be futile or constitute virtual abdication of office .... When a condition of civil disorder in fact
exists, there is obvious need for prompt action ....
A year later in Wood v. Strickland,' the Court applied the same
rationale in extending qualified immunity to school board officials.
Echoing a familiar line, the Court stated:
Denying any measure of immunity in these circumstances "would
contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to
intimidation." The imposition of monetary costs for mistakes
which were not unreasonable in the light of all the circumstances
would undoubtedly deter even the most conscientious school
decisionmaker from exercising his judgment independently [and]
forcefully.'
Finally, in Imbler v. Pachtman,89 the Court extended absolute
immunity to prosecutors for acts falling within the scope of their
prosecutorial duties, concluding that to deny such an immunity
"would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the

85. Id. at 238-49.
86. Id. at 246.
87.

420 U.S. 308 (1975).

88. Id. at 319-20 (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)).
89.

424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system." 90
In the 1982 case of Harlow v. Fitzgerald,9 the Court identified for the first time two additional policy considerations underlying qualified immunity: the need to protect society from the substantial costs associated with the litigation of repeated section 1983
suits and the need to prevent the deterrence of able citizens from
seeking public office.' These two rationales figured prominently
in Harlow, in which the Court extended qualified immunity to
high-ranking White House aides. The Court stated:
[l]t cannot be disputed seriously that [section 1983] claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the guilty-at a cost
not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole.
These social costs include the expense of litigation, the diversion
of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence
of able citizens from acceptance of public office.'
Three years after Harlow, the Court once again relied on the need
to shield the public from the substantial expense of defending
section 1983 suits, holding that under the "collateral order" doctrine, orders denying qualified immunity are subject to immediate
appeal even absent a final judgment.94 The Court concluded that

90. Id. at 427-28.
91. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
92. ld. at 814.
93. Id. The need to restrict litigation costs was of such importance that the Court in
Harlow relied on this consideration to alter the standard governing the adjudication of
qualified immunity claims. Prior to Harlow, qualified immunity was an affirmative defense
entitling a defendant to summary judgment when the defendant did not know (a subjective test) or reasonably should not have known (an objective test) that his conduct would
deprive the plaintiff of protected rights. Id. at 815. After concluding that "substantial
costs attend the litigation of the subjective good faith of government officials," id. at 816,
the Court discarded the subjective test in favor of the objective test alone and held that
defendants are not liable under § 1983 as long as their conduct "does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Id. at 818. The Court explicitly stated that it was altering the standard for qualified immunity in order to "avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the
resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment." Id.
94. Mitchell v. Forsythe, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985). Although 28 U.S.C. § 1291
vests in the court of appeals jurisdiction over appeals only from "final decisions" of the
district courts, the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541, 546 (1949), held that a decision of a district court is appealable, even though it is
not final, if it falls within "that small class which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consider-
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the important cost-saving purpose of qualified immunity would be
lost if a case is permitted to go to trial.' Harlow and later cases
that recognized these two additional rationales for qualified immu-

nity require courts to scrutinize future claims of qualified immunity
to ensure that the extension of immunity serves all three important
purposes enumerated by the Court.9 6
II.

EXTENDING QUALIFIED

IMMUNITY TO PRIVATE PARTIES

A. The Conflict in the Circuits over Private Party Immunity
Even though the Supreme Court's immunity decisions have
been remarkably consistent, the courts of appeals have split in
their resolution of qualified-immunity defenses raised by private
defendants.' Most of the cases decided by the courts of appeals
involve a private defendant who is faced with a civil damage suit
under section 1983 for either invoking the aid of a public official
under an unconstitutional state statute 98 or conspiring with a public official to act outside the official's scope of authority.9 9 Typically, a creditor or other private party invokes a presumably valid
state attachment, garnishment, or replevin statute in order to se-

ation be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." The Court's holding in Cohen is
known as the "collateral order" doctrine. See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 524-25.

95. Id.
96. As several commentators have noted, the Supreme Court has not been concerned
with the absence of empirical proof that qualified immunity actually furthers these three
purposes. See, e.g., Jack M. Beerman, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special
Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51, 94-97 (1989); Gary S. Gilden, Immunizing Intentional Violations of Constitutional Rights Through Judicial Legislation: The
Extension of Harlow v. Fitzgerald to Section 1983. Acts, 38 EMORY L.J. 369, 389-90 &
nn.89-90 (1989); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies: Executive
Official Immunity, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 221, 248 (1984-85); Peter H. Schuck, Suing Our
Servants: The Cour4 Congress, and the Liability of Public Officials for Damages, 1980
Sup. Cr. REv. 281, 282.
97. Private parties may be sued under § 1983 for actions taken "under color of law."
See Adickes v. Kress, 398 U.S. 144, 145 (1970) (holding that private-restaurant owners
who conspire with police to violate the constitutional rights of blacks may be sued for
damages under § 1983).
98. See, e.g., Jones v. Preuit & Maudlin, 851 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1002 (1989); Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir.
1988); Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1983); Folsom Investment Co. v. Moore,
681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982).
99. See, e.g., Felix de Santana v. Velez, 956 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 506
U.S. 817 (1992); Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983); Downs v. Sawtelle,
574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
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cure money or other property from an alleged debtor. 00 After
the debtor successfully challenges the constitutionality of either the
statute or the conduct of a public official, the debtor brings a
section 1983 claim against the private party who invoked the state
aid. The private party then seeks to defend the case by asserting a
qualified-immunity defense. The courts of appeals have diverged
widely in deciding claims of qualified immunity by these private
defendants.
The circuits that have extended qualified immunity to private
defendants rely heavily on both the unfairness of holding private
defendants liable for invoking state statutes that they reasonably
believed were valid and the public interest in encouraging citizens
to rely on presumptively valid legal processes instead of resorting
to other, possibly illegal forms of self-help. In Folsom Investment
Co. v. Moore,'' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
extended qualified immunity to a private defendant sued under
section 1983 for invoking an unconstitutional state attachment statute.' 2 The court stated that under the first prong of the immunity test, "such a citizen, although not immunized per se, would not
have been subject to tort liability prior to the passage of
§ 1983. ' ' "°3 The court explained that, at common law, a defendant in a malicious prosecution or wrongful attachment suit would
not have been liable unless the plaintiff could show malice or a
lack of probable cause." The court reasoned that the existence
of this protection at common law was sufficient to transform the
protection into qualified immunity from section 1983 liability. 5
Under the second prong of the immunity test, the court pointed to
the "important public interest in permitting ordinary citizens to
rely on presumptively valid state laws."' 6 This "compelling public policy"
justified extending qualified immunity to private defendants."0

100. See cases cited supra note 98.

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

681 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1038.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1037.
Id at 1038.
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In Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin,08 the Eleventh Circuit also
extended qualified immunity to private defendants, basing its decision on "the existence of a good faith and probable cause defense
in common law"' 9 as well as "powerful policy considerations.""' The court in Jones expanded upon the reasoning of
the Fifth Circuit in Folsom Investment:
In the same way that we wish to encourage citizens to undertake
public service, so must we encourage them to settle their differences and assert their claimed rights through the employment of
legal mechanisms which they believe, in good faith, are constitutional."'
The court also stated that it would be unfair to treat private parties as state actors but deny them the same immunity granted to
public officials. Such a result, the court stated, would render private defendants "more liable" than public defendants."'
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Jones drew a strong dissent.
The dissent argued that the considerations of public policy underlying the Supreme Court's past immunity decisions simply do not
support extending qualified immunity to private defendants:
Despite the fact that the defendants in this case do not occupy
public office . . . , the majority concludes that they are entitled
to qualified immunity. There is no justification for this extension .... Because none of the policy considerations which support the qualified immunity doctrine is present in this case, the
majority creates its own policy rationale for providing private
actors with qualified immunity. It argues that citizens should not
be exposed to liability based on their use of a state statutory
attachment procedure. While the simplicity of this suggestion may
be appealing, the majority errs by proposing its own policy justification for extending qualified immunity to private defendants.

108. 851
1002 (1989)
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.

F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 489 U.S.
at 1324.
at 1325.
at 1325.
at 1343 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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The dissent branded the decision of the majority "judicial policymaking"'14 and concluded that the extension of qualified immunity to private parties was improper because "no public office or
official discretion is protected.""'
6
In De Vargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., Inc.,1
the Tenth Circuit also upheld a private party's claim of qualified
immunity. The situation in De Vargas, however, was very different
from most other private party immunity decisions and, as the court
itself recognized, was closely analogous to that of a private prison." 7 In De Vargas, the defendant was a private corporation under contract with a state agency to perform security inspection
services."' The private contractor was sued under section 1983
for refusing to process the plaintiff's employment application in
violation of his civil rights."9 The contractor refused to process
the application because its contract with the state prevented the
contractor from hiring individuals with certain physical handicaps.' The Tenth Circuit affirmed the claim of qualified immunity, holding that private parties performing government functions
in accord with duties imposed by a government contract-and sued
solely on the basis of the performance of those duties-are entitled to raise the defense of qualified immunity.121
The court in De Vargas stated that the private contractor's
claim of qualified immunity "presents the strongest arguments for
extending qualified immunity to private ... defendants."'" The
court held that the private contractor's claim met both prongs of
the traditional test for qualified immunity. First, the court noted
that "the functions which the private [contractor] performed pursuant to contract are functions which governmental employees would

114. Id.
115. Id. at 1344.
116. 844 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1988), cerL denied after appeal from remand, 498 U.S.
1074 (1991).
117. Id. at 722 n.11.
118. Id. at 715-16.
119. Id. at 716.
120. Id. The specific regulation at issue stated that "[a] one-eyed individual shall be
medically disqualified for security inspector duties." Id.
121. Id. at 722. In De Vargas, the court explicitly expressed no opinion regarding the
result it might reach if a private contractor performed acts not specifically required by a
government contract, such as discretionary acts performed while operating a private prison. Id. at 722 n.11.
122. Id. at 721.
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perform had the government not contracted them out."" Second, the court stated that the policy considerations making immunity necessary at common law "apply equally to all private defendants acting pursuant to contract." 4 The court stated that "denying immunity would make contractor defendants ...

more timid

in carrying out their duties and less likely to undertake government service."'" The court also stated that "[f]orcing such private contractor[s] . .. to defend meritless damages actions at trial

creates the same distractions from public duties as it does for
public employees."'" Because the private defendant performed a
"governmental function" and supported its claim of qualified immunity with the same traditional policy considerations identified in
past immunity cases, the court in De Vargas allowed the private
defendant to assert a defense of qualified immunity. 27
In Downs v. Sawtelle,' the First Circuit rejected the argument of a private defendant and refused to extend qualified immunity to private parties. Downs was a section 1983 case against a
private party, the plaintiff's guardian, who allegedly conspired with
public officials to sterilize the plaintiff against her will.2 9 The
First Circuit stated that unlike public officials who enjoyed immunity at common law, private individuals were never "shielded from
damage liability in a comparable fashion."'30 The court also stated that the policy considerations underlying immunity for public
officials do not support immunity for private parties: "private
parties simply are not confronted with the pressures of office, the
often split-second decisionmaking or the constant threat of liability
facing police officers, governors and other public officials.' 3' Finally, the court held that although "fairness [may] militate in favor
of extending some immunity to private parties acting in concert

123. Id. at 722.
124. Id at 723.
125. Id
126. Id at 717.
127. Id. at 720-25. See also Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 928-29 (1st Cir. 1992)
(holding that a private social worker who performed statutorily mandated duties pursuant
to a contract with the state is entitled to qualified immunity); Rodriques v. Furtado, 950
F.2d 805, 816 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a private physician who conducted vaginal
search of drug suspect pursuant to a search warrant is entitled to qualified immunity).
128. 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
129. Id. at 3.
130. Id. at 15.
131. Id
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with state officials," fairness was not a proper factor to consider.132 Because none of the traditional policy considerations underlying immunity at common law supported qualified immunity
for private parties, the First Circuit refused to expand the qualified
immunity doctrine. 33
In Duncan v. Peck,TM the Sixth Circuit also refused to extend qualified immunity to private parties. Unlike the First Circuit
case, however, Duncan involved a factual situation identical to
cases in other circuits that extended qualified immunity to private
parties. In Duncan, a private defendant was faced with liability
under section 1983 for securing a prejudgment attachment order
under a statute later held to be unconstitutional. 35 The court denied qualified immunity because there was "no evidence that private parties were immune from suit at common law, and because
the various rationales for good faith immunity are inapplicable to
private parties.', 136 The court rejected the argument that a good
faith defense at common law could be transformed into qualified
immunity. 7 The court also rejected any policy basis for extending immunity to private parties. 38 The court concluded that "a
private party is governed only by self-interest and is not invested
with the responsibilities' 39 of executing the duties of a public official
in the public interest.'
B. Resolving the Conflict. Wyatt v. Cole
In Wyatt v. Cole,"4 the Supreme Court acknowledged the
conflict among the circuits and addressed, for the first time, the

132. 1l at 15-16.
133. Id. at 16. In Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1983), the Ninth Circuit
also refused to extend qualified immunity to private parties. ld.at 385 n.10. See also F.E.
Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d 1312, 1318-19 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating categorically,
without reasoning, that private parties are not entitled to immunity from § 1983 suits).

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
Id.at 1262.
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1265.
Id.at 1266.

139.

Id. Although the court in Duncan denied qualified immunity to private parties, it

stated that private parties can raise a "good faith" defense to § 1983 suits. Id. The distinction between the two defenses is that a good faith defense examines the subjective

intent of the private defendant, whereas qualified immunity is based on an objective standard and can be decided on the pleadings. See id.at 1266.

140. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
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scope of qualified immunity for private parties.'4 ' Wyatt involved
a situation, typical of the cases arising in the circuits, in which a
private defendant is faced with liability under section 1983 for
invoking an unconstitutional replevin, garnishment, or attachment
statute. 4 2 With the aid of his attorney, Cole filed a complaint
under the Mississippi replevin statute, and a state court ordered
the seizure of property in the possession of Wyatt.'4 3 Later, the
court conducted a post-seizure hearing and ordered Cole to return
the property to Wyatt; Cole refused, and Wyatt brought suit in
federal court, arguing that the statute violated his right to due
process by failing to afford judges discretion to deny writs of replevin. Wyatt also sought damages against Cole under section
1983.'" The district court declared the replevin statute unconstitutional on due process grounds but held that Cole was entitled
to qualified immunity." The Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision."
The Supreme Court reversed, stating that Cole's claim of
qualified immunity failed to satisfy its traditional two-part test. 47
The Court first stated that there was insufficient common law
support for private party immunity in suits of this nature.'
Even though private defendants would have enjoyed a good faith
defense at common law for the closely analogous torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process, such a defense did not entitle
them to qualified immunity. 49 The Court brushed aside the inconsistency with its holding in Pierson v. Ray, in which the Court
transformed a good faith defense at common law for the analogous torts of wrongful arrest and imprisonment into qualified im-

141.
142.
143.

id. at 161.
Id. at 161-62.
Id. at 160.

144.

ld.

145. See Wyatt v. Cole, 710 F. Supp 180, 183 (S.D. Miss. 1989), affd, 928 F.2d 718
(5th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 934 F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 504 U.S. 158

(1992).
146. See Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 934 F.2d 1263 (5th
Cir. 1991), and rev'd, 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
147. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164.

148. Id. at 165-66.
149. Id. The Court stated that although the common law defense of good faith might
entitle private defendants such as Cole to a similar affirmative defense of good faith
from liability under § 1983, it did not entitle private defendants to the "type of objectively determined, immediately appealable immunity that respondents asserted below." Id.
at 169, 166.
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munity for police officers.15° The apparent inconsistency shows
that the Court was more concerned with the second policy-oriented prong of its traditional immunity test. In fact, the Court stated,
"the reasons for recognizing such an immunity [in Pierson] were
based not simply on the existence of a good-faith defense at common law, but on the special policy concerns involved in suing
government officials."''
Under the second prong of the traditional immunity test,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, reviewed the special policy considerations underlying qualified immunity for public officials:
Qualified immunity strikes a balance between compensating those
who have been injured by official conduct and protecting
government's ability to perform its traditional functions ....
[W]e have recognized qualified immunity for government officials
where it was necessary to preserve their ability to serve the public good or to ensure that talented candidates were not deterred
by the threat of damage suits from entering public service.52
Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]hese rationales are not transferable to private parties."'53 She contrasted the rationales with the
interests advanced by the Fifth Circuit in support of extending
qualified immunity to private defendants such as Cole.'- 4 The interests advanced by the Fifth Circuit included encouraging citizens
to rely on presumptively valid state laws to resolve disputes and
shielding individuals from money damages when they reasonably
resort to state laws later held to be unconstitutional. 5 Justice
O'Connor concluded that "such interests are not sufficiently similar
to the traditional purposes of qualified immunity" to justify the
56
extension of qualified immunity to private parties.
The Court's obvious concern was that the benefits of qualified
immunity would inure not to the public interest, which is the case
when a public official asserts immunity, but rather solely to the
commercial interests of private parties. The Court stated that "private parties hold no office requiring them to exercise discretion;

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 165-67 (discussing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967)).
at 167.
(citations omitted).
at 168.
at 163.
at 168.
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nor are they principally concerned with enhancing the public
good."'" The Court also stated that the cost-saving rationale
identified in Harlow v. Fitzgerald was inapplicable in suits against
private defendants like Cole because "unlike with government officials performing discretionary functions, the public interest will
not be unduly impaired if private individuals are required to proceed to trial to resolve their legal disputes."' 8 Concluding that
"the nexus between private parties and the historic purposes of
qualified immunity is simply too attenuated to justify such an
extension of our doctrine of immunity,"'' 9 the Court refused to
extend qualified immunity to private defendants such as Cole.
III. EXTENDING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY TO PRIVATE PRISONS
A. DistinguishingWyatt
Although Wyatt presents a hurdle for private parties claiming
qualified immunity from section 1983 suits, it should not preclude
the extension of qualified immunity to private prisons. The Court's
holding in Wyatt makes clear that private defendants who invoke
the aid of state officials under an unconstitutional state statute or
conspire with state officials to act outside the scope of their authority are not entitled to qualified immunity.'" The Court admonished, however, that its holding was limited, implying that
Wyatt would not necessarily bar qualified immunity for private
parties faced with liability under section 1983 in different circumstances.' Significantly, the Court in Wyatt did' not cite or discuss
De Vargas, a pre-Wyatt private party immunity decision that involved a private party performing a government function pursuant
to a contract with the state. 62 Accordingly, the circumstances
surrounding a private prison's claim of qualified immunity should

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 164.
161. In Wyatt, Justice O'Connor stated:
The
The question on which we granted certiorari is a very narrow one ....
precise issue encompassed in this question, and the only issue decided by the
lower courts, is whether qualified immunity, as enunciated in Harlow, is available for private defendants faced with § 1983 liability for invoking a state replevin, garnishment or attachment statute. That answer is no.
Id. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
162. See supra notes 116-27 and accompanying text.
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be sufficiently distinguishable from those of the private defendant
in Wyatt to justify the extension of qualified immunity to private
prisons.
First, unlike the defendant in Wyatt, private prison officials
perform a government function that was protected by immunity at
common law. Under the Court's "functional" approach, qualified
immunity attaches to the government function performed. 6 ' Private prison officials are engaged in the same function and are
required to make the same discretionary decisions as state prison
officials. By operating a prison under a contract with the government, a private prison is the functional equivalent of a state-run
prison. In Procunier v. Navarette,164 the Court extended qualified
immunity to officials and employees of state prisons. 65 Because
private prison officials perform a government function that was
protected by immunity at the time Congress enacted section 1983,
they should be entitled to the same qualified immunity enjoyed by
state prison officials.
Several post-Wyatt private party immunity decisions illustrate
the argument for extending qualified immunity to private parties
based on their performance of a government function. These decisions all rest upon the functional equivalence of the private defendants and state officials, and the fact that the public will benefit
by extending qualified immunity to the private defendants.' 66 In

163. See supra notes 47-68 and accompanying text.
164. 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).

165. Id. at 560-62. Although the Court in Procunier did not explicitly discuss the
immunity afforded prison officials at common law, the Court noted the consensus in the
courts of appeals that "prison and jail administrators performing discretionary functions"
are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 561 n.7. Justice Stevens dissented in Procunier,

stating that the majority had abandoned the traditional "inquiry into the common law
[that] was an essential precondition to the recognition of the proper immunity for any

official." Id at 568 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. See Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 967 (10th Cir. 1995) (granting immunity to private individual who performed strip search pursuant to police request);
Williams v. O'Leary, 55 F.3d 320, 324 (7th Cir. 1995) (granting immunity to private physicians who treated prison inmates pursuant to contract with state), cert. denied, 116 S.

Ct. 527 (1995); Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 402-03 (7th Cir.
1993) (granting immunity to private hospital who treated mental patient pursuant to court
order); Saavedra v. City of Albuquerque, 859 F. Supp. 526, 528-29 (D.N.M. 1994) (granting immunity to private personnel hearing officer who conducted employee grievance
hearing pursuant to contract with city).
Compare Burrell v. Board of Trustees of Ga. Military College, 970 F.2d 785, 792

(11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1814 (1993) (holding that college trustees who
conspired with public officials to fire employee were not entitled to qualified immunity)
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Sherman v. Four County Counseling Center,67 the Seventh Circuit extended qualified immunity to a private mental health center
that administered anti-psychotic medication against the will of a
patient pursuant to a court order." The Seventh Circuit reasoned that a state hospital would be protected by qualified immunity if it had acted precisely as the private facility did. 69 In
Warner v. Grand County,7 ° the Tenth Circuit also extended
qualified immunity to a private defendant, the female director of a
local crisis center, who performed a strip search of several female
detainees pursuant to a police request.'' The Tenth Circuit reasoned that when a private party performs a government function
that the state does not choose to perform, the private party is
entitled to the same immunity that public officials would receive
had they performed the function. 2 It did not matter in either of
these decisions that the party performing the government function
was a private entity. In each decision, the court concluded that the
functional equivalence of the private defendants and public officials removed the case from the ambit of Wyatt. 7'
A private prison should satisfy the second, policy-oriented
prong of the test for qualified immunity as well. The three tradi-

with Moore v. Wyoming Medical Ctr., 825 F. Supp. 1531, 1535-36 (D. Wyo. 1993) (holding that private employees of medical center who confined mental patient to hospital
against her will without direction from public officials were not entitled to qualified immunity).
The court in Burrell, 970 F.2d at 796, explained the distinction between these two
lines of cases:
[W]here the private defendants are not alleged simply to have fulfilled their
duties under a government contract, or to have assumed under court order the
responsibilities of a public official, but are alleged to have acted in concert with
public officials for the sole purpose of depriving another of her constitutional
rights, private defendants cannot claim the protection of qualified immunity .

. .

. Private individuals who associate themselves with a public official to

encroach on another's constitutional rights must bear the risk of trial.
Id at 796.
167. 987 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1993).
168. Id. at 406. In Shennan, a court order provided that the patient was to be taken
to the private facility and that the private facility was to "give whatever treatment is
deemed necessary and appropriate with or without the consent of the Respondent." Id. at
402-03.
169. Id. at 405.
170. 57 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 1995).
171. Id. at 965.
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., id at 965; Sherman v. Four County Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 405
(7th Cir. 1993).
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tional purposes of qualified immunity-preserving the diligent
exercise of official discretion, preventing the deterrence of able
citizens from accepting public service, and reducing the damaging
costs of litigation-all support the extension of qualified immunity
to private prisons. Like public prison officials, private prison officials are entrusted with exercising a large degree of discretion in
overseeing the day-to-day activities of inmates.174 The threat of
damage suits would have no less dampening effect on the ardor of
private officials in their exercise of discretion than it has on public
officials. Furthermore, unrestricted liability for even unknowable
constitutional violations likely would deter qualified contractors
from accepting government contracts and qualified individuals from
working for private prisons, just as it would deter able citizens
from accepting public service. Finally, the substantial litigation
costs that would result from a denial of immunity, rather than
burdening the private contractor, would be passed on to the public
in the form of higher costs for correctional services. Extending
qualified immunity to private prisons will benefit the public by
preserving the cost savings produced by private incarceration. 75
Although Wyatt is distinguishable from the situation presented
by private prisons, several concerns militate against the extension
of qualified immunity to private prisons. Foremost among these
concerns is the argument that private prisons are run for profit
and thus operate under a distinct conflict of interest. In the case
of a private corporation under contract to run a private prison, a
danger exists that the actions of the corporation will run counter
to the public interest. For example, a private prison might cut
corners on medical treatment or commit other constitutional transgressions that result in financial savings. Given such dangers, denying qualified immunity may be necessary to ensure the vigilant
protection of inmates' rights. Second, an immunity rule that guarantees the unfettered exercise of official discretion, although

174. The Supreme Court has recognized the difficulties inherent in the operation of a
prison that make the exercise of discretion essential:
The administration of a prison is a difficult undertaking at best, for it concerns
persons many of whom have demonstrated a proclivity for antisocial, criminal,
and violent conduct... . [Miany inmates do not refrain from harassment and
intimidation. The number of non-meritorious prisoners' cases that come into this
Court's notice is evidence of this.
Cleavenger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 203 (1985).

175. Many state statutes require private prisons to provide cost savings to the state in
order to maintain their contract with the state. See supra note 28.
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proper when a defendant genuinely acts for the public good, may
be inappropriate when private interests are involved. The fairness
concerns that support qualified immunity for public officials perhaps should not apply to corporate officers and employees who
are seeking to maximize corporate profits. Finally, because the
common law never recognized immunity for private citizens, the
extension of qualified immunity to private prison officials may be
nothing more than a "freewheeling policy choice"' 76 by the
courts that private prison officials should enjoy at least the same
level of immunity as public prison officials. Such a policy choice
would be an illegitimate exercise of judicial power in light of the
courts' limited role in qualified immunity cases.'"
B. The Early Federal District Court Decisions
The argument for extending qualified immunity to private
prisons is novel. Only four federal district courts have rendered
decisions on the issue. 78 Perhaps because of the scant precedent
in the area of private party immunity and the controversial nature
of the claim, the decisions are conflicting. These decisions highlight
the central problem of extending qualified immunity to private
prisons: in the case of private prisons, there is an increased risk
that qualified immunity will allow prison officials to maximize
corporate profits at the expense of inmates' protected rights. Although the first two district courts which addressed the proposed
expansion of qualified immunity failed to discuss this problem, the
two later opinions squarely addressed the policy arguments against
extending qualified immunity to private prisons.
In the first case to decide a private prison's claim of qualified
immunity, Tinnen v. Corrections Corp. of America,79 the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Tennessee held that the
private defendant, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),

176. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 170 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,concurring) (quoting
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342 (1986)).
177. The courts' role in qualified immunity cases is limited to interpreting congressional intent at the time Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 (1980). Thus, courts may not expand the qualified immunity
doctrine beyond those immunities existing at common law in 1871. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
178. See supra notes 30-35.
179. No. 91-2188-TUA, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20309 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 21, 1993).
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was entitled to assert a defense of qualified immunity."is CCA
was under contract with the city of Mason, Tennessee, to operate
the West Tennessee Detention Facility (WTDF), which housed
inmates from overcrowded federal and District of Columbia correctional facilities. Tinnen, a District of Columbia inmate at
WTDF, brought a section 1983 suit against the warden, the deputy
warden, a prison counselor, a prison physician, and the chief of
prison security, alleging that he had been denied access to the
court, refused proper medical treatment, and deprived of property
in violation of his protected rights.""'
Concluding that the private prison officials were entitled to
assert a defense of qualified immunity, the court stated that the
rationales underlying qualified immunity fully applied to private
employees of a governmental contractor as well as direct governmental employees." First, the court held that the private prison
officials met the historical test for qualified immunity because they
were required by contract to perform a governmental function.
The court stated that "while the parties have not presented the
court with any common law recognition of private party immunity,
our law clearly establishes that those who are employed to administer jails and prisons housing government detainees are entitled to
qualified immunity."'" The court thus distinguished the case of
Duncan v. Peck,"s in which the Sixth Circuit declined to extend
qualified immunity to private parties due to the absence of private
party immunity at common law."s The court in Tinnen stated
that private prison officials, unlike the private defendants in
Duncan, are "required to exercise the same functions for the benefit of the public good with appropriate force and decision as are
the government employees hired as warden, deputy warden, prison
physician, prison counselor, or as chief of prison security." '1 6 The
court concluded that because the private prison officials are functional equivalents of government prison officials, the private defendants satisfied the first prong of the test for qualified immunity:
At common law, the private prison officials would have been im-

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at *12.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *9-*1o.
Id. at *10-'11.
844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988); see also supra text accompanying notes 134-39.
See Tinnen, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20309 at *3-*5, *10-*11.
Id. at *9.
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mune from liability for actions taken in good faith in operating the
prison facility."
The court also found that the traditional purposes of qualified
immunity supported the private prison's claim of qualified immunity.'8 The court stated that like their public counterparts, private
prison officials "face the dilemma of being required by law to use
their discretion in a way that might unfairly expose them to lawsuits,"' 89 and that they "must be free to exercise their discretion
for the public good without fear ... of inmate damage suits."' 9
The court concluded that "no perceptible reason has been presented to distinguish between those prison administrators who are
paid directly by the government and those who are paid by a
corporation which is paid by the government."' 9' The court did
not discuss the possibility that private prison officials might be
encouraged to violate inmates' rights in order to increase the
corporation's profits.
In Smith v. United States,' the second qualified immunity
decision involving a private prison, the U.S. District Court for the
Middle District of Florida also extended qualified immunity to
private prison officials. 9 3 The plaintiff in Smith brought a Bivens
action" against Goodwill Industries Suncoast, Inc., a private corporation under contract with the United States to operate the
Orange County Community Treatment Center, as well as several
prison officials. 9 The plaintiff, a female inmate at the facility,
alleged that a prison employee had made sexual advances toward
her in violation of her Fifth Amendment right to equal protection
and her Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.'9 Holding in favor of the private defendants,
the court distinguished this situation from that in Wyatt v. Cole
and concluded that "[a]lthough a private contractor may be princi-

187. Id. at *10-'11.
188. Id. at *10.
189. Id. at *10 (quoting Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988)).
190. 1& at *9-*11.
191. Id. at *12.
192. 850 F. Supp. 984 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
193. Id at 987.
194. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs may bring civil rights damage suits against federal officials directly under the Constitution. See supra note 9.

195. Smith, 850 F. Supp. at 985.
196.

Id. at 984-85.
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pally concerned with its private interests, a private contractor is
distinct from the private defendants in Wyatt."1 97 The court stated that unlike the private defendants in Wyatt, the private prison
officials in this case were required to "exercise discretion under
'
the government contract and to perform a public service."198
Although the court did not address each part of the two-part test for
qualified immunity, the court concluded that the private prison
officials were entitled to raise qualified immunity as a defense to
the inmate's claims.1 99 As in Tinnen, the court in Smith did not
address the argument that the extension of qualified immunity
might encourage prison officials to increase profits at the expense
of inmates' rights.
C. The Dissenting Court: Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America
In Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America,2°° the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee disagreed with the
conclusion reached by the first two federal district court decisions
and held that the private defendant, CCA, was not entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense to an inmate's section 1983
suit." The court argued that the private defendant failed to
satisfy either part of the two-part test for qualified immunity. The
court was concerned particularly with what it called "the' '2 implicit
danger of affording qualified immunity to private parties. 02
Manis involved a section 1983 suit by an inmate incarcerated
at a prison operated by CCA who alleged that CCA employees
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.2 3 In rejecting CCA's claim
of qualified immunity, the court concluded first that CCA failed to
meet the requirement of showing an analogous immunity at common law. The court rejected the functional argument and relied on
the Sixth Circuit decision in Duncan v. Peck for the argument that
the common law never extended the doctrine of tort immunity to

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 986.
Id.
Id. at 987.
859 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
Id. at 306.
Id. at 305.
ld. at 303.
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include private defendants.
The Manis court held that this
finding was "fatal" to CCA's claim of qualified immunity.2°
Although the court rejected CCA's argument that it was the
functional equivalent of a public prison and thus was entitled to
the same qualified immunity, the court discussed why CCA also
failed the second policy-oriented test for qualified immunity. The
court took issue with the conclusion in Tinnen and Smith that
public policy supports extending immunity to private prisons.
Focusing on the conflict of interest inherent in the private operation of a correctional facility, the court stated:
In the case of a private for-profit corporation hired to perform a
public function, there is an increased risk that the corporation's
actions will diverge from the public interest. Unlike public officials, corporate officers and employees are hired to serve the
interests of the corporation, and, more specifically, its stockholders, whose principal interest is earning a financial return on their
investment. Indeed, corporate officers owe a fiduciary duty to
advance stockholders' interests, but they owe no such fiduciary
duty to the public at large. 7
This conflict of interest, the court stated, created "an obvious
temptation to skimp on civil rights whenever it would help to
maximize shareholders' profits." 8 The court reasoned that extending qualified immunity to private prisons was not in the public
interest and that in such a situation "the threat of incurring money
damages might provide the only incentive for a private corporation
and its employees to respect the Constitution."' Parting company with the Tinnen and Smith decisions, the court concluded that
because CCA was a "purely private corporation," there was no
compelling reason why CCA should not have to defend civil damage suits by inmates without the benefit of qualified immunity."'0

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 304-05.
Id. at 305.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 306.
Id.
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D. The Response: Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center
A year later in Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center,2u the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana disagreed
with the reasoning of the court in Manis v. CCA and held that
private prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity.2"
Citrano demonstrates that the court in Manis v. CCA failed to
apply the proper analysis in determining whether to extend qualified immunity to private prisons, and that the decision reached in
Manis was wrong.
In Citrano, two inmates brought a section 1983 action against
a private governmental contractor, Wackenhut Corporation, and
several of the private contractor's employees. Wackenhut operated
the Allen Correctional Center (ACC) under a contract with the
state of Louisiana.213 The inmates alleged that several prison employees assaulted them and hindered their attempts to seek redress
for their injuries. They also alleged that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs. 1 4 The court
first recognized that the doctrine of qualified immunity was an
attempt by the Supreme Court to resolve the tension between a
plaintiff's right to compensation when injured by official misconduct and the public interest in the effective performance of certain
discretionary governmental functions.2 5 The court examined several of the Supreme Court's past qualified immunity decisions and
concluded that these decisions extended qualified immunity to new
classes of defendants based on the governmental functions the
defendants performed.21 6 The court concluded that "[t]he determination of whether qualified immunity applies to the personnel at
ACC must also turn on an analysis of function and not on their
status as private parties versus state employees. 21 7 The court
thus disagreed with Manis that the absence of private party immunity at common law was fatal to a private prison's claim of immunity.218 The court stated that the Supreme Court in Wyatt neither

211.

891 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. La. 1995).

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

218.

Id. at 318. The Citrano court noted:

316-17.
314-15.
314.
316.
316-18.
316.
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abandoned its longstanding practice of employing a functional
approach nor intended to create a bright line rule that private parties never are entitled to qualified immunity.219 The court in
Citrano relied on the fact that the private defendants were performing a governmental function protected by immunity at common law and therefore held that the defendants satisfied the historical test for qualified immunity.'
Although the Manis court was correct that courts must look
to history and must not expand the scope of qualified immunity
beyond its historical roots at common lawP' the Manis court
misconstrued the proper analysis by basing the extension of qualified immunity on a defendant's status as a public, not private,
employee. The Supreme Court has made clear that the doctrine of
qualified immunity does not depend on a defendant's status as a
public official but on the particular governmental function the
defendant is required to perform.' The primary justification for
the doctrine of qualified immunity is that it serves to safeguard
the government's ability to perform vital discretionary functions.
Given this justification, whether the defendant in a section 1983
action is a public official or a private party should not matter as
long as the defendant was performing a governmental function,
and the performance of that function is important enough to merit
qualified immunity. 2

The significance of a lack of evidence that the common law ever extended qualified immunity to private citizens is questionable ....
It is apparent that
the common law determined questions regarding immunities based on a
functional approach rather than blindly distinguishing between private parties
and government employees. Accordingly, immunities were extended to witnesses,
jurors, and arbitrators based on the function they served and the rationales
underlying the grant of immunity.
Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 317 (stating defendants "are the functional equivalent of state prison employees, and as such, the same rationales underlying the grant of qualified immunity to
state prison officials have equal application to them").
221. See Manis v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 302, 314 (M.D. Tenn.
1994).
222. See supra text accompanying notes 47-68.
223. The Citrano court stated:
Ordinarily those performing these official functions will be public officials, but
this court has found no evidence that the common law would have denied this
protection to the functional equivalent of a public official merely because he
was an employee of a government contractor versus a direct employee of the
government.
Citrano, 891 F. Supp. at 318.
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The court in Citrano also concluded that public policy supports the extension of qualified immunity to private prisons.?4
Reviewing the policy rationales for qualified immunity, the court
stated:
Litigation costs money and diverts public servants' energy from
their public responsibilities. The threat of liability serves as a
deterrent factor to those considering public service. There is also
the danger that fear of litigation will "dampen the ardor of all
but the most resolute, or the most responsible public officials, in
the unflinching discharge of their duties."'
The court concluded that the repeated litigation of section 1983
claims against private contractors and their employees would create the same social costs that occur when state-operated prisons
are sued' Litigation costs would be passed on indirectly to the
state and the threat of litigation would deter private contractors
when they consider whether to contract with the state as well as
qualified individuals who might otherwise seek employment with a
private contractor. The threat of litigation would have no less of a
dampening effect on the employees of a private contractor in the
discharge of their duties than it does on public officials. In short, a
private contractor performs the same public function as a stateoperated prison and the public interest similarly would benefit if
the private contractor is allowed to perform that function free
from threats of unnecessary litigation.'
Once again, the reasoning of Citrano demonstrates that the
Manis court's analysis is flawed. The Manis court argued that the
extension of qualified immunity to private prisons is unwarranted
because "corporate employees always are compelled to make decisions that will benefit their shareholders, without any direct consideration for the best interest of the public."' This statement in
itself may be a dubious assertion given that private contractors
must fulfill the state's expectations in order to maintain their contracts. Moreover, the significance of the statement is questionable.
Qualified immunity is not based on the fact that public officials
are subjectively motivated by a genuine desire to serve the public's

224. 1l at 317.
225.
226.

Id. (citation omitted).
Id.

227. Id.
228.

Manis v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 302, 305 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
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best interests. Rather, qualified immunity is based on the assumption that the public interest will be best served if those who are
required to perform governmental functions are allowed to do so
without the threat of unnecessary lawsuits distracting them. 9
The test is not whether qualified immunity serves a defendant's
private interests-which it does even when extended to public officials-but whether the extension of qualified immunity benefits the
public interest. Extending qualified immunity to employees of
private prisons benefits the public interest just as it does when
extended to state prison employees: It aids in the effective and
efficient performance of an important governmental function, preserves discretion of the officials, and prevents the deterrence of
qualified individuals from accepting government service. Moreover,
the extension of qualified immunity reduces the costs of incarcerating inmates and thus reduces the cost to the public of financing
private prisons. As long as qualified immunity benefits the public
in these ways, the fact that it also benefits the financial interests of
private defendants is irrelevant.
Furthermore, the possibility that qualified immunity might
inure to the financial benefit of private defendants should cause
little concern. The court in Manis argued that the conflict of interest posed by a private prison's for-profit status would encourage
private prison officials to "skimp" on enforcing inmates' rights
when it would benefit the corporation." As the court in Citrano
correctly noted, however, private prison officials would encounter
great difficulty if they did in fact attempt to "skimp" on the enforcement of inmates' rights' First, qualified immunity provides
protection from liability only when an objectively reasonable official could have believed that what he did was lawful in light of
clearly established law. 2 Punishing an official for conduct that
he could not have reasonably known to have been improper can
provide little additional deterrent value. 3 Given the limited na-

229. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167 (1992) (stating that qualified immunity has
been recognized for those who perform governmental functions "where it was necessary
to preserve their ability to serve the public good").
230. Manis, 859 F. Supp. at 305.
231. Citrano v. Allen Correctional Ctr., 891 F. Supp. 312, 319-20 (W.D. La. 1995).
232. See supra note 11; see also Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986) (stating
that qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law").
233. See Jones v. Preuit & Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1325 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that

1084

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:1049

ture of immunity, it would be difficult for an official to profit from
repeated constitutional violations.' Officials who knowingly and
purposefully violate the Constitution to increase corporate profits
will not enjoy the protection of qualified immunity. The Manis
court concluded otherwise without demonstrating how officials
could accomplish the difficult task of squeezing profits from the
violation of inmates' rights while at the same time remaining immune from liability for damages under section 1983.'s
Second, mechanisms other than litigation exist to ensure that
private prison officials do not violate the rights of inmates.26
State enabling legislation often sets forth strict contractual provisions that must be contained in every contract with a private contractor. These provisions contain standards and criteria against
which a private contractor's performance is measured.'
Cost

"[n]o additional deterrence can be achieved by punishing individuals who could not reasonably have known that their actions were improper").
234. Citrano stated:
Further, squeezing profits out of violations of constitutional rights would
be a tricky path to navigate at best. Qualified immunity does not allow the
clever or unusually well-informed violator of constitutional rights to evade liability. . . Qualified immunity does not open a window of opportunity for the exploitation of constitutional rights. This court fails to see any significant danger
that the grant of qualified immunity in this case will serve as a disincentive to
compliance with the Constitution.
Citrano, 891 F. Supp. at 319-20.
235. The Citrano court also noted:
Nor is it clear how profits and "skimping" on civil rights are related.
Manis does not articulate how a corporation might reasonably expect to materially increase profits through civil rights violations. Even if it is assumed that
expenses can be reduced by "skimping" on civil rights, government is no doubt
also motivated to cut costs.
Id. at 319.
236. The Supreme Court has stated that liability under § 1983 is not always necessary
to ensure that public officials do not violate citizens' civil rights because alternative safeguards exist. For example, in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), the Supreme
Court stated that the extension of absolute immunity to prosecutors "does not leave the
public powerless to deter misconduct or to punish that which occurs." Id. at 429. The
Court noted that other "checks undermine the argument that the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the constitutional rights of
persons accused of crime." It The Court pointed to existing liability for willful criminal
acts and the availability of professional discipline by the state bar to deter prosecutorial
misconduct, Id.
237. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 957.04(1)(d), 957.07, 957.11 (West Supp. 1995);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 33-1-17(c)(1) (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE. ANN. §§ 41-24-105(d), (e)
(Supp. 1995); TEx. LOCAL GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 361.062(1), (8) (West 1996). Private
prisons are often, if not always, required to meet the demanding national accreditation
standards of the American Correctional Association. See Thomas & Logan, supra note 5,
at 238 n.9.
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and quality standards enhance the accountability of private contractors, often creating greater accountability than that in state

prisons.0 8 The quality of care in private facilities is often higher

as well?3 9 Contract provisions also remove private prison person-

nel from all decisions directly implicating inmate release and parole eligibility,2'

es,242

sentence credits,24'

furlough and work releas-

and disciplinary action.243 Most contracts allow states to

impose financial sanctions"e' or even cancel a contract and take
control of a facility if a private contractor fails to meet the state's
requirements.245 Private contractors are not free to maximize
profits without considering that the interests of the corporation

and its shareholders are best served by meeting the state's expectations. 2
238. Two commentators have stated:
The true structure of traditional government-managed departments of corrections
is radically different from what the critics seem to imagine. Multiple layers of
unelected government officials commonly exist between elected officials in the
executive and legislative branches of government and those who actually deliver
cortectional services. When inefficiency or ineffectiveness does exist, it is exceedingly difficult to detect and . .. it is substantially more difficult to place
responsibility directly at the feet of those who are elected....
The irony, of course, is that one of the most obvious advantages of contracting is that it significantly enhances accountability and control.
Thomas & Logan, supra note 5, at 232.
239. Studies have compared responses from inmates in public and private facilities
regarding their assessment of certain areas of care, including conditions of confinement,
programs and services, disciplinary procedures, grievance mechanisms, access to legal
assistance, release procedures, and relations with visitors. In these studies, inmates usually
rated private facilities equal to or higher than state facilities in the various areas of comparison. See id. at 226-29.
240. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-108(1) (Michie 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 957.06(5) (West Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-110(1) (1990); TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 494.004(1) (West 1990).
241. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.06(5) (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 33--3--9(D) (Michie Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-110(2) (1990); TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 494.004(2) (West 1990).
242. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-108(3) (Michie 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 957.06(6) (West Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-110(3) (1990); TEx. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 494.004(3) (West 1990).
243. See, eg., ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-108(5) (Michie 1995); FtA. STAT. ANN.
§ 957.06(3) (West Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-110(5) (1990).
244. Wayne H. Calabrese, Low Cos High Quality, Good Fit Why Not Privatization,
in PRIVATIZING CORRECIONAL INSTITUTIONS, supra note 3, at 187-89.

245. See, eg., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.14 (West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1-17(C)(4), (7) (Michie 1990); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(a)(4) (Supp. 1995).

246. In addition to an interest in profitability, shareholders have an interest in maintaining their stock's value, which could fall if a private contractor faces scandal, lawsuits
or uninsurability due to mismanagement. See Thomas & Logan, supra note 5, at 233.
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Finally, monitoring by state officials and public scrutiny are
routine when a private contractor operates a correctional facility.247 Most states who contract for the private operation of prisons and jails require a state-employed contract monitor to check
private contractors' quality of care and to verify compliance with
contractual standards.' In some cases, the monitor is a full-time
employee who works at the private facility.249 In addition, external observers (such as the media and human rights organizations)
provide informal monitoring of private prisons."0 The level of
scrutiny received by a private contractor ordinarily exceeds that received by state-operated prisons." Although monitoring and
public scrutiny cannot ensure that private prison officials always
will act properly, they do provide a greater incentive to protect
prisoners' rights. The court in Manis failed to take into account
the policing effect of these alternative safeguards.
CONCLUSION

Qualified immunity serves to safeguard the effective performance of important governmental functions. It should not matter
whether those functions are performed by governmental employees
or private parties. Just as qualified immunity for public officials
protects the effective functioning of government by preserving
discretion and restricting the social costs of litigation, extending
qualified immunity to private contractors operating correctional
facilities serves the same purposes. Although qualified immunity
inures to the financial benefit of private contractors who are motivated by a desire to make a profit, it also benefits states and
ultimately the public. Moreover, there is little risk that private
contractors will be able to "skimp" on the enforcement of inmates'
rights in order to increase corporate profits. Qualified immunity

247.

See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 206-07.

248. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.04(1)(g) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring a full-time
monitor to have unlimited access to the private facility); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 197.510(28) (Baldwin 1991) (requiring frequent monitoring); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-1-17(C)(7) (Michie 1990) (requiring monitoring of compliance); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 41-24-109 (1990) (same). See also LOGAN, supra note 6, at 206.
249. Calabrese, supra note 244, at 184. See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 494.003(c)(1) (West 1990).
250. See LOGAN, supra note 6, at 207.
251. See Calabrese, supra note 244, at 184-85; LOGAN, supra note 6, at 207; Thomas
& Logan, supra note 5, at 232.
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provides only limited protection from liability under section 1983,
and mechanisms other than liability, including strict contract provisions, state monitoring, and public scrutiny, operate to ensure that
the civil rights of inmates are protected.

